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Abstract
A principal objective of the welfare reform act of 1996 (PRWORA) was to encourage welfare 
recipients to obtain jobs rapidly, a strategy termed "Work First." Much analysis shows that Work 
First raises the incidence of direct-hire and - in a sizable minority of cases - temporary-help 
agency jobs among welfare clients. But the effect of these jobs on longer term labor market 
outcomes, such as labor force participation, earnings, and welfare recidivism, is unknown. 
Because welfare recipients who obtain jobs rapidly are positively selected from the pool of all 
Work First participants, a simple comparison of long-term outcomes among job takers and non- 
takers is potentially misleading.
We evaluate the effects of Work First job placements on program recidivism and earnings of 
welfare recipients over a two-year period following Work First program assignment. We draw 
upon administrative data from an unusual policy experiment in the state of Michigan. Welfare 
recipients in a major metropolitan were randomly assigned to a large number of Work First 
contractors that had widely varying placement rates in direct-hire and temporary-help jobs but 
provided otherwise similar services. These assignments significantly impacted job-finding rates 
among ex ante comparable clients living in the same neighborhoods. We find that Work First 
placements in direct-hire jobs substantially raised earnings over the two years following program 
assignment, but that temporary help agency placements yielded no lasting gains in welfare 
recipients' employment and earnings.
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A principal objective of U.S. welfare reform legislation in 1996 (PRWORA) was to 
encourage welfare recipients to obtain jobs rapidly. Indeed, Federal regulations essentially 
require that individuals work as a condition for welfare receipt. Much analysis shows that 
welfare-to-work programs, implemented to help place welfare recipients in jobs, raise the 
incidence of direct-hire and - in a substantial minority of cases - temporary-help agency jobs 
among welfare participants. But whether these programs, often called "Work First," improve 
longer term labor market outcomes and reduce welfare dependency is unknown. Because Work 
First participants who obtain jobs are positively selected from the pool of all participants, a 
simple comparison of long-term outcomes among those who take direct-hire jobs, those who take 
temporary agency jobs, and those who find no employment while in the Work First program is 
potentially misleading.
We evaluate whether Work First job placements in direct hire and temporary help jobs 
improve employment and earnings and reduce program recidivism over a two-year period 
following Work First program assignment. Our analysis draws upon administrative data from an 
unusual policy experiment in a major metropolitan area in Michigan. In this metropolitan area 
welfare recipients were, in effect, randomly assigned among Work First contractors servicing 
their districts. These contractors had significantly different placement rates in direct-hire and 
temporary-help jobs, but provided otherwise similar services. We exploit the fact that contractor 
assignments significantly affected the rates of direct-hire and temporary job placements among 
ex-ante comparable participants living in the same neighborhoods to identify the effects of 
direct-hire and temporary agency job placements on Work First participants' earnings and 
program recidivism.
Our analysis utilizes administrative data from the Work First program linked with 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage records data for over 50,000 Work First spells initiated 
from 1997 to 2003. The Work First data include demographic information on participants and 
detailed information on jobs found during the program. UI wage records enable us to track 
earnings of all participants over time. Among Work First participants who found employment, 
about 20 percent held temporary help jobs.
Exploiting the randomization of Work First participants to Work First program 
contractors with differing job placement policies to draw causal inferences, we find that only 
Work First placements in direct-hire jobs substantially raise earnings and reduce program 
recidivism over the subsequent two-year period. Placement of Work First participants in 
temporary agency jobs does not improve outcomes relative to not placing individuals in jobs. 
Numerous robustness and consistency tests confirm that these results are comparable across 
randomization clusters within our metropolitan area and are stable across time periods.
The organization of our paper is as follows. Section 1 elaborates on the questions we 
address in our paper, reviews prior research methodologies and findings on these issues, and 
outlines our methodological approach. Section 2 details our econometric methodology. Section 
3 describes the Work First program and our data. It also presents tests confirming that 
assignment of Work First participants among contractors operating in the same district is 
consistent with random assignment, but that job placement outcomes among contractors 
operating in the same district are significantly different. Sections 4 and 5 present our main 
findings on the consequences of job placement and job type on program recidivism and long- 
term earnings. Section 6 concludes and discusses implications for policy.
1. Hypotheses and Methodologies 
a. Hypotheses
The underlying premise of welfare reform legislation was that welfare recipients could 
find stable employment and escape poverty and welfare dependency, given proper incentives and 
assistance in finding suitable jobs. Pursuant to federal regulation, states generally require some 
work as a condition of welfare receipt. Most states, including Michigan, have implemented a 
"Work First" strategy, in which applicants for TANF assistance who do not meet mandatory 
work requirements must participate in programs that help them find employment. These Work 
First programs emphasize job search and placement services, and provide few resources for other 
services such as assessment of participants' needs or job training. In our paper, we analyze 1) 
whether job placements through our Michigan Work First program improve long-term outcomes 
for program participants, and 2) whether long-term outcomes differ between placements with 
temporary help agencies and those directly with employers.
Whether the Work First approach improves long-term outcomes for welfare participants 
has been at the heart of the intense debate over the merits of welfare reform. Supporting the 
Work First approach is a substantial body of research on government-sponsored job programs 
suggesting that programs emphasizing job search and readiness services are more effective than 
more expensive classroom training programs in placing individuals in improving individuals' 
earnings (Bloom et al. 1997; Riccio et al. 1994; Martinson and Freedlander 1994). On the other 
hand, some researchers have stressed that many on welfare face multiple barriers to employment, 
including drug abuse, learning disabilities, mental health problems, and domestic violence 
(Danziger and Seefeldt 2002, Ramey and Keltner 2002). Skeptics of welfare reform argue that 
the Work First emphasis on rapid job placement fails to address the underlying problems that 
hamper many welfare recipients from obtaining stable employment and escaping poverty. Thus,
on the margin, job placements through Work First programs may fail to improve long-term 
outcomes because these program participants require more intense interventions.
In addition, we should note that even if welfare reform policies improve long-term 
outcomes, it is possible that the Work First programs designed to help individuals find jobs have 
little value-added. The main effect of work requirements may be to discourage individuals from 
applying for welfare benefits and instead to encourage them to find employment on their own. 
Similarly, mandatory Work First programs for welfare applicants may not lead to better jobs for 
these individuals than the jobs they would find on their own.
A separate but related controversy concerns the high incidence of temporary help 
employment among Work First participants. In the Work First data reported below, about 20 
percent of those finding employment while in the Work First program obtain a job with a 
temporary help agency. These high rates of temporary agency placements are not unusual. 
Recent analyses of state administrative welfare data reveal that 15 to 40 percent of former 
welfare recipients who obtained employment in the years following welfare reform took jobs in 
the temporary help sector. 1 In spite of the high incidence of temporary help employment among 
welfare participants, there is little consensus as to whether these jobs benefit or harm the long- 
term employment outcomes among this population. Two plausible, but opposing, hypotheses of 
how temporary agency jobs may impact the career trajectories of welfare recipients and other 
low-skilled workers have been articulated.
One hypothesis is that temporary help agencies may face lower screening, termination, 
wage, and other non-wage costs compared to client employers, and hence they may hire 
individuals who otherwise would have been unemployed (Autor, 2003; Houseman, Kalleberg,
1 See Autor and Houseman, 2002, on Georgia and Washington state; Cancian et al., 1999, on Wisconsin; Heinrich, Mueser and 
Troske, 2002, on North Caroline and Missouri; and Pawasarat, 1997, on Wisconsin.
and Erickcek, 2003; Autor and Houseman, 2002). Accordingly, spells in temporary help may 
reduce the time workers spend in unproductive, potentially discouraging job search, and facilitate 
rapid entry into employment. Temporary assignments may further permit workers to develop 
human capital and labor market contacts that lead, directly or indirectly, to longer-term jobs. 
Several pieces of evidence support the plausibility of this hypothesis. The vast majority of 
temporary help workers leave the sector within one year, indicating high mobility (Segal and 
Sullivan, 1997). A panel study of Michigan TANF recipients shows three-fourths of those taking 
temporary agency employment reported learning new skills on the job and one-fourth reported 
that temping led to a permanent job at the firm (Corcoran and Chen, 2004). A relatively high 
fraction of low-wage workers in the temporary help sector eventually transition to higher wage 
jobs in other sectors (Andersson, Holzer, and Lane, 2005). Consistent with this evidence, a large 
and growing number of employers use temporary help assignments as a means to screen workers 
for direct-hire jobs (Abraham, 1988; Autor, 2001; Houseman 2001, Kalleberg et al. 2003), a 
practice that appears particularly prevalent in the manufacturing sector (Ballantine and Ferguson, 
1999).
A contrasting but coherent alternative hypothesis is that the unstable and primarily low- 
skilled placements offered by temporary help agencies provide little opportunity or incentive for 
workers to invest in human capital or develop productive job search networks (Jorgenson and 
Riemer, 2000). In support of this view, several researchers document that workers in temporary 
agency jobs receive on average lower pay and fewer benefits than would be expected in direct- 
hire jobs (DiNatalie, 2000; General Accounting Office, 2000; Segal and Sullivan, 1998). And 
while mobility out of the temporary help sector is high, a disproportionate share of leavers enters 
unemployment or exits the labor force (Segal and Sullivan, 1997). These facts would not be of
great concern if temporary help jobs exclusively substituted for spells of unemployment. But to 
the degree that spells in temporary help crowd out productive direct-hire job search, they may 
inhibit longer-term labor advancement. Under this scenario, the short term gains accruing from 
nearer-term employment in temporary help jobs may be offset by employment instability and 
poor earnings growth.
b. Previous Research: Approaches and Evidence
Distinguishing among these competing hypotheses is an empirical challenge. The average 
characteristics of the non-employed are likely to be substantially different from the employed (as 
is true in our data). And among the employed, those taking temporary agency jobs likely differ 
from those in direct-hire jobs. Although some characteristics, such as education and labor force 
history, can be directly controlled in a regression, others like motivation and job-preparedness 
will impact earnings but are unobservable in conventional data sources. Consequently, analyses 
of the effects of temporary help and direct-hire jobs on subsequent labor market progression that 
do not take adequate account of these confounding factors are likely to be unconvincing and 
potentially biased.
Although a large literature examines the effects of various aspects of welfare policy 
reform on participant outcomes,2 to our knowledge, no previous study addresses whether job 
placements in Work First programs improve long-term participant outcomes. 3 Several recent 
studies have tried to identify the effects of temporary agency employment vis-a-vis direct-hire 
and non-employment on subsequent labor market outcomes among welfare or low-income
2 Blank (2003) provides an excellent summary of the methodologies and findings in the voluminous literature on the effects of 
welfare reform.
3 In practice, the performance of local Work First service providers typically is evaluated based on several criteria, such as the 
fraction of participants placed in jobs and, among those placed, the fraction remaining employed after 90 days. No follow-up 
data are collected for those who leave the program without finding a job, and thus not even crude comparisons of outcomes 
between those finding jobs and those who do not are conducted. Hence, these evaluation criteria reveal nothing about the effects 
of job placements on participant outcomes short or long term.
populations. Lane et al. (2003) use matched propensity score techniques to study the effects of 
temporary agency employment on the labor market outcomes of low-income workers and those 
at risk of being on public assistance. To adequately control for selection bias through propensity 
score techniques, it must be the case that differences among those in temporary, direct-hire, and 
non-employment are fully captured by variables observable to researchers. In addition, 
researchers must be able to construct comparable groups of individuals in non-employment, 
temporary agency jobs, and direct-hire jobs using these observable variables. In the SIPP data 
Lane et al. utilized, there was insufficient overlap in a key variable earnings histories among 
those in temporary, direct-hire, and non-employed to construct well-matched groups, a fact that 
they acknowledge potentially biases their results. With this caveat, they cautiously conclude 
from their analysis that temporary employment improves labor market outcomes among those 
who might otherwise have been unemployed, and suggest the use of temporary agencies by 
welfare agencies may be beneficial.
Heinrich, Mueser and Troske (2002) study the effects of temporary agency employment 
on subsequent earnings among welfare recipients in two states. To control for possible selection 
bias in the decision to take a temporary agency job, they estimate a selection model that is 
identified through the exclusion of various county-specific measures. Interestingly, their 
correction for selection bias has little effect on their regression estimates, suggesting either that 
the selection problem is unimportant or that their instruments do not adequately control for 
selection on unobservable variables. 4 Like Lane et al., they find that the earnings trajectories of
4 Their empirical strategy assumes that the county-level variables used to identify the selection model influence earnings only 
through their impact on employment and job type, an assumption they acknowledge is likely violated.
those taking temporary help jobs are somewhat worse than of those taking direct-hire jobs, but 
are significantly better than of those who are not employed.
Several recent studies have addressed the role of temporary employment in facilitating 
labor market transitions in Europe. Using propensity score matching methods, Ichino et al. 
(2004) conclude that jobs with temporary help agencies significantly increase the probability of 
finding permanent employment within 18 months relative to unemployment. Booth, Francesconi 
and Frank (2002) and Garcia-Perez and Munoz-Bullon (2002) study the effects on subsequent 
employment outcomes of temporary (agency and fixed-term) employment in Britain and 
temporary agency employment in Spain, respectively. Their empirical strategies are similar to 
those used in Heinrich, Muser, and Troske (2002) and they also find generally positive effects of 
temporary employment.
In sum, recent studies generally conclude that temporary agency employment serves as a 
stepping stone for the non-employed welfare or low-income workers into employment. What 
these studies have in common is that they draw exclusively on observational data to ascertain 
causal relationships. Hence, their findings will depend critically on the methods used to correct 
the non-experimental data for self-selection into temporary help, direct hire, and non- 
employment. 
c. Our Methodological Approach
To potentially overcome these confounds, we exploit a unique, multi-year policy 
experiment in a large Michigan metropolitan area. For the administration of Work First and 
related welfare programs, this metropolitan area was divided into multiple geographic districts, 
with typically two or three independent organizations or "contractors" providing Work First 
services to participants in each district in any given program year. As we demonstrate below,
within each district, the division of Work First participants among contractors was 
observationally equivalent to random assignment. Within many of the districts, however, there 
were large and persistent differences across contractors in the fraction of participants who were 
placed in temporary agency jobs, who were placed in direct-hire jobs, and who were not placed 
in any job. These differences, we argue, likely reflected differences in policies and practices 
among Work First contractors and constitute natural experiments.
We exploit these differences in the probability of temporary agency, direct-hire, or non- 
employment among statistically identical populations to identify the effects of Work First 
employment and job type on long-term earnings and program recidivism. In our econometric 
specification, we use contractor assignment as an instrument for whether an individual obtains 
employment while in the program, and, conditional on employment, the job type. Our 
methodology assumes that contractors only affect participant outcomes through their effects on 
job placements. We provide some support for this assumption below.
2. Using Randomization to Study the Impact of Temporary Help Employment on 
Participant Outcomes
A formidable obstacle to determining how spells in temporary help and direct-hire 
employment affect Work First participants' earnings and employment is, as noted, that key 
confounding characteristics such as job preparedness and motivation are unobservable in 
standard data sources (including our own). To purge this bias, we require a source of variation 
that affects the probability that participants obtain temporary help or direct hire employment 
versus non-employment but does not otherwise impact their outcomes. In this analysis, we use 
the random assignment of participants to Work First programs as this source of variation.
Formally, define each Work First participant's potential outcome set as the triple 
Yt = {¥',Yt d ,Y"}, where the superscripts t,d,n correspond to participants' potential outcomes after
obtaining temporary help employment, direct-hire employment, or no employment during the 
Work First treatment period. There are two parameters of interest for our analysis, 
5ln = E[Y' - Y" ] and 5dn = E[Yd - 7" ]. The first parameter is the effect of temporary help relative 
to non-employment on the outcome variable, and the latter is the effect of direct hire 
employment relative to non employment on the outcome (with 5td =E[Yl - Ycl ] = 5tn - 5dn by
transitivity).
Because we observe only one employment status for each participant, we must estimate the 
parameters 8m and 8dn by contrasting outcomes among participants who obtained different 
employment statuses. Define the job status attained by each participant as J = {t,d,n}. A 
comparison of outcomes among Work First participants with different employment status J will 
generally not recover the parameters of interest. Contrasting for example the outcomes of 
participants with temporary employment versus no employment yields the following expression 
(cf. Angrist and Imbens, 1995):
In this equation, the first term in the bottom row is the effect of temporary employment 
relative to non-employment among participants who attained temporary help employment, Stn , 
which is a parameter of interest. The second term is the average difference in potential outcomes 
conditional on non-employment for the participant group that obtained temporary help 
employment relative to the participant group that did not attain employment. We would generally 
presume that this latter term is positive; participants who obtained temporary employment while 
in the Work First program would have fared on average better than those who remained
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unemployed regardless. Consequently, estimates of equation (1) will typically be upward biased. 
A similar bias holds when using E[Y \ J = d] - E[Y \ J = n] to estimate 8dn .
To purge this bias requires a source of variation that influences participants' employment 
status but is independent of potential outcomes. The candidate instrument Z that we use is 
participants' assignment to Work First sites within districts. For simplicity, but without loss of 
generality, let us assume that there are three sites to which participants may be randomly 
assigned (in a district), with Z denoting a participant's site assignment: Z G {1,2,3}. Define 
Jz e {t,d,n} as the employment status that the participant would attain during her Work First 
spell if assigned to site Z. The potential employment status J. is assumed to exist for every 
person in the sample, although of course each person is only assigned to one site. For each 
sample member, we observe the triple {Z,J,Y} where Z is site assignment, Y = Yj is the 
outcome variable, J = Jz = I {Z = 1}   Jl + 1 {Z = 2}   J2 + 1 {Z = 3}   J3 is employment status attained 
during the spell, and 1 { } is the indicator function.
To use site assignment as an instrumental variable for studying the impact of temporary 
employment on participant outcomes, we make two key identifying assumptions. First, given 
random assignment of participants across sites, we assume that the random variables 
{J^J^J^Y^Y^Y^} are jointly independent of Z. This independence assumption is supported by 
the evidence below that the demographics of participants randomly assigned to the two programs 
are in general statistically indistinguishable. Second, we assume that site assignment only affects 
participant outcomes through its effect on employment status (temporary, direct-hire, or no 
employment) attained during the Work First spell. This exclusion restriction amounts to 
assuming that the minimal variation among sites in participant counseling services has negligible 
effects on participant outcomes beyond its impacts on job placement.
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Under the independence and exclusion assumptions, the differences in outcomes across 
sites 1, 2 and 3 are caused by site-level level differences in the distribution of employment 
outcomes (direct-hire, temporary, and non-employment) among participants assigned to those 
sites. For example, the contrast in outcomes between participants assigned to sites 1 and 2 may 
be written as follows:
E[Y\Z = l]-E[Y\Z = 2]
= E 
^ '
This equation indicates that the expected difference in mean outcomes between site 1 and 
site 2 participants is composed of six contrasts between potential outcomes for participants 
whose employment status is changed by the random assignment: the contrast for those whose 
employment is switched from temporary employment to non-employment and visa versa; the 
contrast for those switched from direct-hire employment to non- employment and visa versa; and 
the contrast for those switched from direct-hire employment to temporary help employment and 
visa versa. Each term in equation (2) represents the average effect on the outcome variable for 
participants who are induced to switch employment status among {d,t,n} due to the 
randomization weighted by the share of participants whose employment statuses are changed. 
We do not assume that the contrast in outcomes for participants switching from one employment 
status to another (say from temporary help employment to non- employment) is equal to the 
contrast in outcomes for participants switching in the opposite direction (i.e., from non- 
employment to temporary help employment) since the sets of individuals switching in opposing 
directions are, by definition, non-overlapping. 5 Additionally, participants whose employment
Hence we do not assume, for example, that E[Y^ -Y1 | J, = t,J^ - n] = E[Y^ -Y2 \Ji =n,Jj =t].
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status is not altered by their program assignment do not contribute to the contrast of outcomes in 
equation (2). We can similarly write set of six contrasts for E[Y \ Z = 1] - E[Y \ Z = 3], with J3 
replacing J2 and 73 replacing Y2 in equation (2). 6
With three observed outcomes {}^,72 ,73 } and twelve contrasts among potential outcomes, 
we must place additional structure on the problem to draw inferences about the parameters of 
interest.
One set of assumptions sufficient to identify S'" and Sdn in our experimental setup is that 
there is no heterogeneity in treatment effects among the treated- that is the effect of direct-hire 
versus non-employment, Sdn , and the effect of temporary help versus non-employment, S'" are 
the same for all of those induced to change program outcome by contractor assignment:
(3) Y;-Y?=6m , Yd -Y?=8dn V i.
Under this constant treatment effects assumption, equation (2) reduces to:
E[Y\Z = l]-E[Y\Z = 2]
(4) = (Pr[y, = d] - Pr[J2 = d])Sdn + (Pr[ J, = t] - Pr(J2 = t])8'n
= rl sdn +y2 s'n ,
where / = Pr[ J, = d] - Pr[ J2 = d] and y2 = Pr[ J, = t] - Pr[J2 = t]. Similarly, we can write the 
contrast between mean outcomes at sites 1 and 3 as:
(5) E[Y\Z = l]-E[Y\Z = 3] = y35dn + y*Sln ,
where / = Pr[J, =d]- Pr[J3 = d] and / = Pr[7, =t]-Pr[J, = t] .
Equations (4) and (5) yield a system of two equations and two unknowns:
6 The contrast E[Y \ Z = 2] - E[Y \ Z = 3] is simply a linear combination of the prior two contrasts.
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This system we can readily solved for S and 8 using the observed contrasts in mean 
outcomes across sites Y} ,Y2 ,Y3 and the relative frequencies of direct-hire, temporary-help and 




This demonstrates that in a constant treatment effects model, the contrast in outcomes across 
participant sites is sufficient for identification of the causal parameters of interest.
Although this assumption may appear quite restrictive at first blush, our sample of 
welfare recipients is fairly homogeneous and, presumably, the subsample whose employment or 
job status is impacted by program assignment is more homogeneous. Below, we utilize over- 
identification of our parameters to present evidence suggesting that an assumption of a constant 
treatment effect among those affected by program assignment may be a reasonable 
approximation.
Even if the constant treatment effects assumption does not hold (but the assumption that 
program assignment affects outcomes only through its effect on employment status continues to 
hold), we may still ascribe a causal interpretation to differences in outcomes across programs. 
These differences would represent the marginal effect on outcomes of a treatment that induces 
higher rates of temporary agency or direct-hire employment. Thus, our policy experiment 
directly addresses the policy-relevant question of whether an increase in temporary agency or 
direct-hire job placements confers, on balance, long-term benefits among the program's clientele. 
However, in this case, the mixture of employment status switches as shown in (2) would be
7 Because randomization insures the independence of J and Z , parameters {/,..., /} may be estimated consistently as 
Y = {Pr(J = d\Z = l)- Pr(J = d \ z = 2)}, and similarly for y2 , etc.
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unknown, and hence estimates would not have a direct interpretation as the effect of temporary 
help or direct-hire employment for a specific population. 
3. The Michigan Work First Program and Data 
a. Program Context
In the metropolitan area we study, individuals applying for Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) must report the Family Independence Agency (FIA) office servicing 
their district. FIA determines their eligibility for cash assistance and refers them to a Work First 
contractor. Eligible applicants not meeting mandatory work requirements must begin the Work 
First program within approximately two weeks of applying for assistance. In districts with more 
than one Work First contractor, contractors alternate taking new participants. Thus, assignment 
to a Work First contractor depends on the timing of when an individual applies for TANF 
benefits.
The focus of the Work First program, as the name implies, is to place participants quickly 
into jobs. All contractors operating in our metropolitan area offer a fairly standardized one-week 
orientation that teaches participants basic job-search and life skills. Services such as child-care 
and transportation are provided by outside agencies and are available on an equal basis to 
participants at all contractors.
By the second week of the program, participants are expected to search intensively for 
and find employment. While participants may find jobs on their own, job developers at each 
contractor play an integral role in placing participants. Job developers encourage participants to 
apply for or discourage participants from applying for jobs with certain employers, including 
temporary agencies. Job developers also provide more targeted services, helping to screen 
participants and referring them to employers for specific job openings. In addition, they often 
arrange visits by employers, who screen and recruit participants for jobs directly at the
15
contractors' Work First office. Thus, the jobs that Work First participants hold depend, in part, 
on the employer contacts that their contractor's job developers have. Of particular interest for 
our study, the probability of holding a temporary agency job depends partly on job developers' 
beliefs about the suitability of temporary agency employment for their participants, which, in 
turn affects referrals and other contacts they provide with agencies.
Critical to our empirical approach is the assumption that contractors only affect 
participant outcomes by affecting the probability of placing individuals in jobs and the types of 
jobs in which they are placed. The fact that very few resources are spent on anything besides job 
development, that general or life skills development occurring in the first week of the program 
are very similar across contractors, and that support services (e.g. childcare and transportation) 
that would aid in job retention are provided outside this program and are equally available to 
participants in all contractors supports this assumption. 
b. Data and Randomization
Our data set comprises administrative records data from the Work First program linked 
with quarterly earnings from the state of Michigan's unemployment insurance wage records data 
base. For our metropolitan area, we have Work First administrative data on all Work First spells 
initiated from the fourth quarter of 1999 through the first quarter of 2004. The data include 
information on the FIA district and Work First contractor to which the participant was assigned, 
and basic demographic information on age, race, gender, and education level. Individuals may 
have multiple spells in our data. In addition, one of our outcome measures is program recidivism 
anywhere in the state. To construct this measure, we link Work First data for our metropolitan 
area to state level Work First program data to identify individuals who reentered the Work First 
program elsewhere in the state.
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An important and unique feature of our Work First data is that they include detailed 
information on jobs obtained by Work First participants while in the program. For each spell, we 
have information on the hourly wages, weekly hours, employer name, and job title for up to six 
jobs obtained while the individual was in the Work First program. We construct the implied 
weekly earnings for each Work First job by multiplying the reported hourly wage rate by weekly 
hours. We used the employer name in conjunction with several lists of temporary help agencies 
in the metropolitan area to code each employer as either a temporary agency or a direct-hire
n
employer. In a small number of cases where the appropriate coding of an employer was 
unclear, we collected additional information on the nature of the business through an internet 
search or telephone contact. We coded jobs into broad occupational groups based on job title.
Work First administrative data are linked to quarterly state-level unemployment 
insurance earnings records. 9 These data include total earnings in the quarter and the industry in 
which the individual had the most earnings in the quarter. UI wage records data are available 
from the third quarter of 1997 through the fourth quarter of 2004. We constructed earnings for 
the eight quarters prior to the quarter of program entry for each participant spell. We were able 
to construct quarterly earnings for four quarters following the quarter of program entry for each 
participant spell in our sample; where possible, we constructed quarterly earnings out to eight 
quarters following the quarter of program entry.
In thirteen of the FIA districts in our metropolitan area, more than one Work First 
contractor serviced the district over the time period studied. 10 Contracts to provide Work First
8 Particularly helpful was a comprehensive list of temporary agencies developed operating in our metropolitan area as of 2000, 
developed by David Fasenfest and Heidi Gottfried.
9 The UI wage records exclude earnings of federal and state employees and the self-employed.
10 We dropped two districts from our sample because each included a contractor servicing primarily ethnic populations. For these 
contractors only, Work First participants throughout the metropolitan area were allowed to select one of these two providers if
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services ran for one year, from the fourth quarter of a calendar year through the third quarter of 
the following year. Although the contractors providing services within a district could change 
across program years, there was considerable stability in the assignment of contractors to 
districts, particularly in the last two and a half program years covered by our data.
From the thirteen districts represented in the three and a half program years covered by 
our data, we selected Work First spells initiated in the last two and a half program years in six 
districts to form the "primary" sample for which we report results below. Although the 
discussion below focuses on results from our primary sample, we also report results over the 
entire time period and for all thirteen districts to show that our conclusions are not sensitive to 
the selection of this sample. We selected this primary, six-district sample because: 1) contractor 
assignments within these districts were stable over this time period (a number of changes in 
contractor-district assignments occurred between the first and second program years covered by 
our data); and 2) within each of the six districts, there were large and persistent differences 
across contractors in the fraction of Work First participants placed in jobs and/or the type of job 
placement (temporary versus direct hire).
Table 1 presents the means of variables on demographics, work history, and earnings 
following program entry for all Work First participants in our primary sample as well as by 
program outcome: direct-hire job, temporary agency job, or no job. The sample as a whole is 
predominantly female (94 percent) and black (96 percent). Slightly under half of Work First 
spells resulted in job placements. Among spells resulting in jobs, 20 percent have at least one 
job with a temporary agency.
they were unable to speak English. Thus, the participant pool serviced by these contractors was quite different from that of the 
other contractor operating in the district.
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The average earnings over the four quarters following program entry are comparable for 
those obtaining temporary agency and direct-hire jobs, while earnings for those who do not 
obtain employment during the Work First spell are 40 to 50 percent lower. These simple 
comparisons have no causal interpretation. As is evident from the other descriptive statistics 
reported in Table 1, the average characteristics of Work First participants vary considerably 
according to Work First job outcome. Those who do not find jobs in Work First are more likely 
to have dropped out of high school and to have work fewer quarters and have lower prior 
earnings than those who find jobs. Among those placed in jobs, those taking temporary agency 
jobs actually have somewhat higher average prior earnings and quarters worked than those 
taking direct-hire jobs. Not surprisingly, those who take temporary jobs in Work First have 
higher prior earnings and more quarters worked in the temp sector than those who take direct- 
hire jobs. Data used in previous studies show that blacks are much more likely than whites to 
work in temporary agency jobs (Autor and Houseman 2002; Heinrich, Muser, and Troske 2002). 
Even in our predominantly African-American sample, we also find this relationship.
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that there are large average differences in the 
observed characteristics of Work First participants with direct-hire, temporary agency, and no 
jobs. These differences in demographic characteristics and work histories likely affected job 
placements in Work First and subsequent labor market outcomes. The large differences we 
observe suggest that there may also be important differences we do not observe in the 
characteristics of Work First participants that affect job placements and subsequent labor market 
outcomes. Thus, simple comparisons of outcomes among Work First participants in direct-hire, 
temporary agency, or no employment or even simple regressions that only control for
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differences in observed characteristics are unlikely to provide a reliable estimate of the effect 
of direct-hire or temporary agency employment on subsequent earnings.
Our approach to addressing the potential selection problem exploits the natural 
experiments within the six Work First districts comprising our primary sample. If assignment of 
Work First participants across contractors operating within each of these six districts is 
functionally equivalent to random assignment, then the large and persistent differences among 
contractors in job placement patterns arguably are attributable to differences in contractor 
practices not to differences in the Work First populations serviced by the contractors. 
Therefore, it is important to establish that these Work First assignments are consistent with 
random assignment. Accordingly, for each district and year, we test for non-random assignment 
of the following participants characteristics to contractors in the district: gender, race, age, high- 
school drop-out status, number of quarters worked in the eight quarters prior to program entry, 
number of quarters primarily employed with a temporary agency in these prior eight quarters, 
total earnings in these prior eight quarters, and total earnings from quarters where a temporary 
agency was the primary employer in the prior eight quarters.
To implement this test, we estimate a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) system for 
each district and year and use it to calculate the probability that the observed distribution of 
participant covariates across contractors within districts and years is consistent with chance. 11 
Let Xkidt be a k x 1 vector of covariates containing individual characteristics for Work First 
participant i assigned to one Work First contractor in district d during year t. Let ZUt be a 
vector of indicator variables designating the contractor assignment for participant /, where the
11 This method for testing randomization across multiple outcomes is proposed by Kling et al. 2004 and Kling and Liebman 2004.
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number of columns in Z is equal to the number of contractors in district d , Let Ik be a k by k 
identity matrix. We estimate the following SUR model:
(8) xdt =(ik ®(zdt \}}e + u xdt =(*;',. ..,xkdl 'y ,
Here, Xdt is a stacked set of the participant covariates, the set of control variables include 
contractor assignment dummies and a constant, and D is a matrix of error terms that allows for 
cross-equation correlations among participant characteristics within district-contractor cells. 12 
The p-value for the joint significance of the elements of Z in this regression system provides an 
omnibus test for the null hypothesis that participant covariates do not differ among Work First 
participants assigned to different contractors within a district and year, with a high p-value 
corresponding to an acceptance of this null.
The p-values for the significance of Z in estimates of equation (8) for each district and 
year (6 districts x 4 years) are provided in Table 2 in the row labeled "Randomization." 
Consistent with the hypothesis that assignment of Work First participants across contractors 
operating within each district is functionally equivalent to random assignment, we find that 22 of 
24 comparisons accept the null hypothesis at the 10 percent level or better.
These 24 individual tests are not entirely germane to our subsequent analysis, however. 
Our main analyses in the outcomes sections pool variation across districts and years to identify 
the effect of Work First job status on labor market outcomes. Hence, it is critical to perform 
grouped statistical tests to evaluate the validity of the randomization for the entire experiment. 
With 24 independent p-values, a simple comparison of each p-value to a conventional 
significance threshold (such as a = 0.05) is likely to lead to one or more false rejections of the 
null. To maintain the overall probability of Type I error at a target level, we implement Holm's
12 Since the contractor assignment dummies in Z are mutually exclusively, one is dropped.
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Sequentially Selective Bonferroni Method for multiple-comparisons (Holm, 1979). The Holm 
version of the widely-used Bonferroni multiple-comparison test provides a more conservative 
test of our null hypothesis that these eight covariates are balanced across contractors operating 
within each district in each program year i.e. the test is more likely to reject our hypothesis of 
random assignment. The Holm-Bonferonni method is explained in some detail in the Appendix. 
We discuss the results here.
The p-values for the Holm-Bonferroni tests for the Work First randomization are given in 
Table 2. The right-hand column of the table provides p-values for the multiple comparison test of 
randomization of participant characteristics in all six districts in each assignment year. The 
bottom row of the table provides p-values for the multiple comparison test of randomization of 
participant characteristics in all four assignment years in each district. The bottom right-hand cell 
of the table provides the p-values for the multiple comparison test for all districts and years 
simultaneously.
Consider first the top row in the right-hand column. The p-value of 0.10 indicates that for 
all six districts considered simultaneously in assignment years 1999-2000, the null hypothesis of 
random assignment is accepted at the 10 percent level. Subsequent rows show this null is 
accepted at or above the 10 percent level in each year of the randomization. Similarly, the bottom 
rows of each column show that the null of random assignment is accepted at the 7 percent level 
or better for each of the six districts considering all four years of data simultaneously. Finally, 
the bottom-right cell of Table 2 reveals that the omnibus test for all 24 comparisons - that is., the 
entire experiment - is consistent with the null of random assignment with a p-value of 0.84 level. 
In net, the distribution of Work First participants across contractors within districts appears 
functionally equivalent to what would be achieved by random assignment.
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4. First Stage Results: The Impact of Contractor Assignment on Employment 
Outcomes
a. Do Contractor Assignments Affect Job Placements?
Having established that the randomization of participants across contractors within 
districts appears valid, we now test whether the random assignment of participants to contractors 
had significant effects on the job outcomes - direct-hire employment, temporary help 
employment, no employment - that participants obtained during their Work-First spells. We 
evaluate this hypothesis in manner identical to our prior test for participant randomization. 
Specifically, we estimate a set of SUR models akin to equation (8) where in this case the 
dependent variables are participants Work First job outcomes following program assignment 
rather than their demographic characteristics and prior earnings history. Whereas in the prior test 
of randomization, we expected that characteristics of incoming participants would be balanced 
among Work-First contractors within a district, here we anticipate that job outcomes of 
participants will differ significantly depending on the Work First contractors to which they are 
assigned.
Results for this set of tests are also provided in Table 2. For each district and year, we 
tabulate two p-values, one corresponding to the null that overall employment/non-employment 
rates did not differ across sites in a district-year (a two-way comparison), and the second 
corresponding to the null hypothesis that temporary-help employment, direct hire employment 
and non-employment rates did not differ across sites in a district-year (a three-way comparison). 
Since overall employment may be identical across sites even while direct-hire and temporary 
employment levels differ substantially, the two and three-way hypotheses tests are not nested.
Consistent with expectations, most comparisons soundly reject the null hypothesis of no 
effect of contractor assignments on participants' job placement outcomes. Of 24 three-way
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comparisons of job placement outcomes across contractors within each district-year shown in 
Table 2, only two have a p-value higher than 10 percent, and 19 of 24 have a p-value at or under 
1 percent. This stands in sharp contrast to the p-values for the tests of random assignment, where 
only 2 of 24 comparisons are significant at the 5-percent level. These results are indicative of 
highly significant contractor effects on job placements among randomly assigned participants.
We next perform Holms-Bonferroni tests for multiple comparisons to evaluate whether 
we can reject the null of no contractor effects on job outcomes across multiple sites and years. 
Paralleling the randomization tests in the prior section, the right-hand column of Table 2 
provides p-values for the multiple comparison test across all six districts in each assignment year 
and the bottom row provides p-values for the multiple comparison test across all four assignment 
years in each district. These tests provide quite strong support for the efficacy of the research 
design: all of the tests of contractor-assignment effects on participant job placements - either 
across contractors within a year or within contractors across years - reject the null at the 2- 
percent level or better. Moreover, the omnibus test for all 24 comparisons (bottom-right cell of 
the table) rejects the null of no contractor effects on participants' job outcomes at the 0.02 level 
for the two-way comparison and at less than the 0.01 level for the three-way comparison. Given 
the evidence above that participants were effectively randomized across contractor sites, we 
conclude that contractor assignments had highly significant effect on participant's subsequent 
job placements. 
b. The Effect of Job Placements on In-Program Earnings
We now present initial evidence on the relationship between participants' program 
assignments and their "in-program" earnings - that is, wage and hours for jobs obtained during
24
Work First spells (recorded by Work First contractors). 13 These short-term earnings measures do 
not provide a complete account of the earnings of Work First participants. In-program earnings 
are collected only for Work First participants who successfully find a job placement during their 
Work First spell. They do not enumerate short-term earnings of Work First participants 
terminated from their programs due to rules violations or inadequate job search - even if these 
participants find outside employment immediately. Our primary purpose in this section is 
therefore to summarize the earnings and occupational characteristics of jobs obtained by Work 
First participants during program spells. As it turns out, these in-program outcome data will also 
prove useful in interpreting our later results for long-term employment and earnings 
consequences of Work First job placements.
We begin by estimating the following model by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS):
(9) yicdl = <* +* A+s2Tt +xlp+yd +et +rA + ^  
The dependent variable in this equation, yicdt , is the in-program earnings variable (real 
hourly or weekly wages, average weekly hours) of individual i assigned to contractor c in 
randomization district d in year t. In this model, Di and 7) are indicator variables equal to one 
if the participant obtained a direct-hire or temporary-agency job during the Work First spell, X 
is a vector of covariates including gender, race (white, black or other), age, education (primary 
school only, high school dropout, high school graduate, greater than high school), and UI 
earnings (in real dollars) for the 4 quarters prior to random assignment, and y and 9 are vectors 
of district and year dummies respectively. In estimating equation (9), we calculate Huber-White 
robust standard errors clustered at the contractor x year of assignment level to account for the
13 Hours and earnings data used for estimates of in-program earnings models correspond to the first direct-hire or temporary help 
agency job a participant took during her Work First spell. By definition, hours and earnings are equal to zero for participants who
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grouping of participants within Work First service programs. The coefficients of interest in this 
model are 8} and 82 , which estimate the contrast in hours and earnings for participants who 
obtained direct-hire or temporary-agency jobs during their Work First spells relative to 
participants who did not obtain any employment. Since in-program earnings and hours are by 
definition zero for participants who do not find employment in Work First, OLS estimates of ^,
and S2 will necessarily be positive.
The first column of Table 3 presents an estimate of equation (9) for our primary six- 
district sample using Work First participant cohorts entering 2000 through 2003. Participants 
who obtained any employment during their Work First spell received, on average, $7.37 per 
hour, worked 34.5 hours per week, and earned $257 per week. Columns (4) and (5) of Table 3 
re-estimate this OLS model for wages and hours, now differentiating between temporary-help 
and direct-hire job placements. The three-way contrast reveals that hourly wages, weekly hours, 
and weekly earnings are uniformly higher for Work First participants in temporary help jobs than 
in direct-hire jobs. These differences are both economically and statistically significant. The 
mean hourly wage in temporary agency job placements is 7 percent higher, weekly hours are 9 
percent higher and weekly earnings are 16 percent higher than in direct-hire jobs.
While this pattern stands in contrast to the widely reported finding of lower wages in 
temporary help positions (cf. Segal and Sullivan, 1998), it appears consistent with the substantial 
differences in the occupational distribution of temporary help and direct-hire jobs observed in 
our data. As shown in Figure 1, production and health care positions (primarily nursing aids) 
account for almost 50 percent of temporary help jobs but less than 20 percent of direct-hire jobs 
held by Work First participants. Production and healthcare jobs also have among the highest
did not obtain any employment during their Work First spells. Since Work First contractors face powerful incentives to dutifully
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hourly and weekly wages in our sample, as is shown in Appendix Table 1 (clerical work is the 
highest overall, however). By contrast, direct-hire workers are dispersed across a variety of 
predominantly low-paying service occupations including cashier, janitor, sales worker, and 
childcare occupations. Fewer than 1 in 20 direct-hire workers hold production positions, as 
compared to 1 in 3 temporary help workers.
As with prior earnings comparisons, these relationships do not have a causal 
interpretation. Participants who find employment during their Work First spell differ 
systematically from those who do not (Table 1); consequently, wages for these workers are 
unlikely to provide a reliable guide to the potential earnings of non-employed Work First 
participants.
We next estimate two-stage least squares (2SLS) models for Work First participants' in- 
program earnings, where contractor random assignments are used as instrumental variables for 
participants' employment status attained during their Work First spells. The 2SLS estimates of 
equation (9) do have a causal interpretation. In the LATE framework above, these estimates will 
recover the effect of Work First job placements on in-program earnings for participants whose 
employment status is changed by their contractor random assignment. We refer to these 
participants as 'marginal' employees.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 provide 2SLS estimates of the effect of any Work First 
employment on in-program hours and earnings for marginal employees. In the first specification 
(column 2), Work First participants' employment status is instrumented by contractor assignment 
dummies; in the subsequent specification, employment status is instrumented by contractor x 
year of assignment dummies. Both models yield a striking pattern of results: hourly wages for
track the hours and earnings of their program participants, these administrative earnings measures are generally quite accurate.
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marginal workers are distinctly lower - by about 40 cents, or 5 percent - than the corresponding 
OLS estimates. These differences, which are highly significant, suggest that Work First 
participants whose employment outcomes are changed by their contractor assignment (those at 
the margin of employment versus non-employment) have weaker skills than infra-marginal 
Work First workers. This finding is a robust result of our analysis, as demonstrated below.
Columns (5) and (6) of the Table repeat these 2SLS estimates, now differentiating 
between direct-hire and temporary-help job placements (both instrumented by contractor 
assignment or contractor assignment x year dummies). In both columns, we find that 'marginal' 
temporary help workers and 'marginal' direct -hire workers command lower wages (on the order 
of 5 to 7 percent lower) than do inframarginal workers in the same job categories. This is again 
consistent with our underlying econometric assumption that Work First participants 'pushed' 
into temporary-help and direct-hire jobs by their contractor assignments are primarily drawn 
from the ranks of participants who would otherwise be non-employed.
Notably, the 2SLS estimates also bear out the finding that Work First participants placed 
in temporary help jobs earn more per hour than participants placed in direct hire jobs. In fact, the 
gap between the estimated direct-hire and temporary-help hourly earnings in 2SLS models is 
quite comparable to that for the OLS model.
The lower panels of Table 3 present comparable analyses for weekly hours and weekly 
earnings. In contrast to the findings for hourly wages, 2SLS estimates for the effect of 
employment on weekly earnings are generally quite comparable to the corresponding OLS 
estimates. The difference between OLS and 2SLS estimates for weekly hours helps to explain 
why. The 2SLS models find that marginal workers typically work 2 to 3 more hours per week 
more than do inframarginal workers, a difference that is highly significant. Since marginal
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workers have lower hourly earnings but higher weekly hours than inframarginal workers, the net 
result is that 2SLS estimates for weekly earnings are comparable to the corresponding OLS 
models. 14
To reiterate, Table 3 reveals two key results. First, the short-term earnings gains are 
generally greater for temporary help than direct-hire placements, particularly on a per-hour basis. 
Second, Work First participants whose outcomes are changed by the experiment appear to have 
lower earnings power than inframarginal workers - that is, workers who find jobs regardless of 
their contractor placements. These results suggest that our identification strategy of using 
contractor random assignments as instrumental variables has the potential to identify the effects 
of Work First job placements on participants' post-assignment labor market outcomes.
To evaluate the robustness of these main findings, we present several further sets of 
estimates performed on expanded data samples. In Panel B of Table 3, we expand the sample to 
encompass the 1999 entering Work First cohort (in addition to the 2000 through 2003 cohorts in 
Panel A). Although the Michigan economy was at a business cycle peak in 1999 that 
subsequently became a prolonged contraction starting in 2000, we find very similar patterns for 
the more inclusive sample. In the expanded sample, temporary help workers earn higher hourly 
wages than do direct hire workers; and marginal workers (both temp and direct-hire) earn less 
than their inframarginal counterparts. We expand the sample further in Table 4 to include all 13 
random assignment districts for both 2000 to 2003 and 1999 to 2003 (Panel B). The qualitative 
pattern of results is again closely comparable. 15
14 One puzzling finding in Table 3 is that the estimated weekly hours of marginal temporary-agency workers are typically lower 
than those of inframarginal temporary workers while the estimated weekly hours of marginal direct-hire workers are typically 
greater than those of inframarginal direct-hire workers. These differences are not generally significant (particularly in later tables 
but are nevertheless unexpected.
15 The one exception is that it is less clear in the expanded sample that marginal-direct hire workers earn less than inframarginal 
direct-hire workers (though this pattern remains clearly visible for temporary help workers).
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5. The Longer-Term Consequences of Work First Job Placements: Evidence on Work 
First Recidivism and Payroll Earnings
Although the Tables 3 and 4 results appear to provide encouraging initial evidence that 
Work First placements into direct-hire and temporary help jobs raise the earnings of Work First 
clients, they may be potentially misleading for two reasons. The first is that the in-program 
measures above only reflect earnings accrued during the Work First employment spell, which is 
typically brief. If these initial job placements are transitory and they do not foster subsequent 
employment opportunities, the short-term earnings gains may be rapidly eroded by spells of non- 
employment. Secondly, because the in-program earnings measures exclude any wage earnings 
for participants terminated from Work First - even those that find work immediately - the 
estimated wage effects of Work First job placements on subsequent earnings may be upward 
biased, though in practice this bias may be small.
To provide a more comprehensive assessment of the effect of Work First job placements 
on participants' employment and earnings, we must look to other outcome measures. One such 
measure available in the administrative data is Work First recidivism. 
a. The Effect of Job Placements on Work First Recidivism
Recidivism in Work First in the Michigan metro area that we study is high. Thirty-six 
percent of Work First participants in our sample reenter the Michigan Work First program within 
360 days of the commencement of their prior spell, and 53 percent reenter within 720 days. 16 
recidivism is substantially lower for participants who find employment during their Work First 
spell, however. As is shown in Table 5, participants who obtain any employment during their 
Work First spell are 8 to 13 percentage points less likely to reenter the program within one to two
16 Our data do not allow us to determine whether participants reenter Work First in other states.
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years following Work First entry than are participants who do not obtain employment. These 
differentials, obtained from OLS estimates of equation (9), are highly significant.
When we subdivide jobs obtained during Work First into temporary-help and direct-hire 
positions, we find notable differences. Participants who obtain direct-hire jobs are 10 to 14 
percentage points less likely to reenter the program in one to two years than are participants who 
do not find a job. Participants who take temporary-help jobs are also less likely to reenter than 
non-job-takers, but this differential is much smaller than that for direct-hire jobs: 4 to 8 
percentage points versus 10 to 14. Both point estimates are significantly different from zero. 
They are also significantly different from one another.
These pronounced recidivism differentials are not surprising in light of the earlier 
comparisons of participant characteristics by Work First employment status (see Table 1). 
Participants who obtained any employment during their Work First spells had significantly 
higher earnings and more quarters in paid employment in the year prior to Work First placement 
than did participants who did not obtain jobs. This suggests that there may be other factors not 
measured in our data that affect both in-program employment and long-term outcomes. In this 
case, some or all of the negative correlation between Work First job placement and subsequent 
recidivism would be explained by heterogeneity among Work First participants rather than true 
effects of job-taking on recidivism.
To purge this source of bias, we estimate 2SLS models for program recidivism where 
participants' Work First employment outcomes are again instrumented using randomized 
program assignments. These instrumental variables estimates differ substantially from their OLS 
counterparts. In fact, 2SLS models for the two-way comparison between employment and non- 
employment in Table 5 never detect a significant effect of Work First job placements on
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subsequent recidivism. Moreover, the 2SLS estimates are typically close to zero or weakly 
positive, suggesting that Work First job placements may slightly increase recidivism among 
participants.
When we disaggregate Work First placements into temporary-help and direct-hire 
positions - again, using program assignments as instrumental variables - an equally striking 
pattern emerges. These estimates reveal that the small and statistically insignificant effect of any 
employment on Work First recidivism appears to mask large, countervailing impacts of 
temporary-help and direct-hire job placements. Columns (5) and (6) find that direct-hire 
placements reduce participants' Work First recidivism by 15 to 30 percentage points over the one 
to two years following placement. Conversely, temporary help placements are found to increase 
program recidivism by 20 percentage points (more in some estimates) during the one to two 
years following program entry.
It must be stressed that most estimates obtained using the 2SLS model in the primary 6- 
district sample are not statistically significant. In addition, the estimated magnitudes are typically 
smaller in magnitude (though still sizable) when contractor x year assignments are used as 
instruments rather than simply contractor assignments. However, the pattern of results 
suggesting that direct-hire job placements reduce program recidivism and that temporary-help 
placements raise recidivism is remarkably consistent and stable across all of the many samples 
and time periods found in Table 5.
These results provide some initial evidence that the positive, short-term effects of job 
placements on in-program earnings documented in Tables 3 and 4 may not culminate in net gains 
in Work First participants' labor market outcomes. At a minimum, the 2SLS recidivism 
estimates provide no evidence that Work First job placements reduce welfare dependency in the
32
one to two years following Work First assignment. More speculatively, the results suggest that 
temporary-help and direct-hire job placements have opposing impacts on Work First 
participants' post-program outcomes, with direct-hire placements reducing welfare dependency 
and temporary-help placements increasing it.
b. The Effect of Job Placements on Longer-Term Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence 
from Matched Unemployment Insurance Records
We now employ the quarterly earnings records from the state of Michigan's 
unemployment insurance (UI) database linked to administrative Work First records to assess how 
Work First job placements affect earnings over one to two years (at quarterly intervals) following 
random assignment. 17 We again estimate OLS and 2SLS variants of equation (9), where the 
outcome variable is the sum of real UI payroll earnings over a designated time interval following 
Work First placement.
As an initial test of the reliability of the UI data, we estimate the relationship between 
participants' in-program job placements and their reported UI earnings during the actual calendar 
quarter of their Work First program assignment, which we refer to as 'quarter zero.' The UI 
records should accurately capture all payroll earnings received in the state of Michigan excluding 
those of federal and state employees and the self-employed. We therefore expect to find that 
participants who obtain employment during their Work First spell will have higher UI earnings 
during their actual quarter of assignment than participants who do not find jobs. 18
The first set of rows in Table 6 provides earnings estimates for quarter zero for the 
primary, six-district sample. The OLS estimate in column (1) shows that participants who find
17 Although it is potentially feasible to track post-assignment earnings for more than 8 quarters, this is not currently practical 
because only 1 to two years have elapsed since assignment for the bulk of the Work-First spells in our sample.
18 We do not generally use quarter zero earnings as a primary outcome measure, however. Since participants' Work First spells 
may commence at any point during a calendar quarter, UI earnings observed in quarter zero potentially combines earnings 
accrued both before and after the Work First placement.
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employment during their Work First spell have significantly higher UI earnings than those who 
do not. The point estimate for this contrast is 306 dollars, with a standard error of 17. When we 
distinguish between temporary help and direct-hire jobs, we also find highly significant 
relationships. Both job types are associated with approximately 300 additional dollars of quarter 
zero UI earnings, and the estimates for temporary-help and direct-hire jobs do not differ 
significantly.
The next columns of Table 6 provide 2SLS estimates of the effect of job placements on 
quarter zero earnings. These estimates also confirm the quality of the match between the Work 
First and UI databases. Consistent with the administrative wage records for in-program earnings, 
the UI data confirm that marginal job-placements induced by the randomization lead to 
significant gains in payroll earnings in quarter zero, the calendar quarter of the Work First 
placement. 19 These results provide assurance that the UI data is suited to measuring the effects 
of Work First job placements on subsequent payroll earnings.
We now perform estimates of the effect of Work First job placements on payroll earnings 
for quarters 1 through 4 following Work First assignment. These estimates have several 
advantages over the prior administrative wage results. First, all UI earnings during these quarters 
reflects post-assignment earnings, providing a longer-term follow-up on the earlier in-program 
earnings results. Second, because both in-program and out-of-program earnings are captured by 
the UI data, the analysis is not biased towards under-counting payroll earnings of participants 
who exit Work First and find employment immediately. Consequently, 2SLS estimates of the 
relationship between Work First placements and post-assignment UI earnings analysis should
19 We have no reason to expect a correlation between the point in a calendar quarter when participants enter a Work First spell 
and their subsequent employment outcomes during that spell. Hence, 2SLS estimates of the effect of in-program job placements 
on quarter zero earnings should not be biased by the possible inclusion of pre-assignment UI earnings in the quarter zero
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provide a fairly clean and powerful test of whether Work First job placements raise participants' 
total payroll earnings.
Descriptive OLS estimates in columns (1) and (4) show that direct-hire and temporary- 
help Work First placements are associated with substantially higher payroll earnings in the year 
following the commencement of a Work First spell. Participants who obtain any employment 
during their spell earn approximately 1,700 dollars more in quarters 2 through 4 than do 
participants who do not find employment. The point estimates for direct-hire and temporary help 
jobs are also quite comparable to one another (column 4). Taken at face value, these results 
suggest that both types of job placements are equally effective for raising participants' payroll 
earnings.
The 2SLS estimates for these models suggest otherwise. This may initially be seen by 
comparing the OLS and 2SLS estimates for the effect of any in-program employment on UI 
earnings in quarters two through four (columns 2 and 3). As noted, OLS estimates indicate that 
participants who obtain any job during their Work First spell earn about 1,700 dollars more in 
quarters two through four than participants who do not take a job. When Work First employment 
is instrumented with contractor assignment, however, this earnings effect falls to 851 dollars, 
which is statistically significantly different from zero and from the OLS estimate. This 
comparison suggests that the OLS comparisons may substantially overstate any effect of Work 
First job placements on post-placement earnings.
Subsequent columns of Table 6 reveal why OLS and 2SLS estimates diverge. In the 
2SLS models in columns (5) and (6), we find that temporary-help and direct-hire placements 
have strongly countervailing effects on participants' payroll earnings. Direct-hire job placements 
induced by randomized contractor assignments have large, positive and highly significant effects
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on payroll earnings, typically in the range of 1,700 to 3,500 dollars over quarters two through 
four following contractor assignment. The 2SLS estimates of the effects of temporary-help 
employment on subsequent payroll earnings, by contrast, are primarily negative and occasionally 
large, though generally not significant.
In Table 7, we extend the analysis over a longer time period to evaluate the effect of job 
placements on payroll earnings over the eight calendar quarters following Work First contractor 
assignment. For this analysis, we limit the sample to participants placed prior to 2003, i.e., those 
for whom we have sufficient post-placement earnings data. We find that the effects of Work First 
job placements on payroll earnings strongly persist into the second earnings year following 
placement. For the sub-sample used for this analysis, we confirm that direct hire Work First 
placements induced by contractor assignment also yield an earnings gain of approximately 1,600 
to 4,000 during quarters two through four following the start of the spell (all estimates are 
significant). In the second year following placement, we find that assignment-induced direct-hire 
placements also raise earnings in quarters five through eight by an additional 1,600 to 5,900 
dollars (all significant). In net, Table 7 shows that direct hire placements increase Work First 
participants' payroll earnings by 4,000 to 11,000 dollars in the two years following placement.
In contrast, estimates for the effect of temporary-help placements on post-program 
earnings are uniformly negative for quarters two through eight following the commencement of 
the Work First spell. These earnings losses average two to three thousand dollars in quarters two 
through four and an additional one to three thousand dollars in quarters five through eight. 
Although most of point estimates are not significant at below the 10 percent level, the 
consistency of the signs and magnitudes of the results strongly suggests that temporary help 
placements do retard subsequent payroll earnings.
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One notable pattern shown in the final rows of Table 7 is that 2SLS estimates of the 
effect of any Work First placement on payroll earnings over the two years following assignment 
are generally positive but insignificant. From this pattern, one might conclude that Work First 
job placements have generally modest and non-robust effects on clients' later earnings. But the 
breakdown of Work First placements into temporary-help and direct-hire placements clearly 
shows that the relatively weak pooled effect masks a strong positive effect of direct-hire 
placements on earnings and an imprecise but decidedly negative effect of temporary-help 
placements on Work First participants' earnings.
UI earnings are a function of individuals' hourly wages and of the hours spent in 
employment. Unfortunately, we cannot decompose the effects of job placement on earnings into 
the part attributable to variation in wage levels and the part due to variation in hours worked with 
our data. However, the data do allow us to tell whether an individual had any earnings, and 
hence any employment, in a quarter, which is a crude measure of the amount the individual 
worked. Paralleling our analysis of participant earnings, we examine the effects of job 
placement on quarters of employment up to two years following program entry. Tables 8 and 9 
report these results for our six primary randomization districts over the 2000-2003 period and the 
1999-2003 period.
Placement in any job significantly increases the quarters of employment in both OLS and 
2SLS models. According to our 2SLS estimates, placement of Work First clients in any job 
increases quarters of employment 0.3 quarters in the initial quarter following program entry, by 
0.3 to 0.4 quarters in the second through fourth quarter following entry, and by 0.7 to 0.9 
quarters over the eight quarters following entry.
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However, these estimates for any job placement mask large differences in the impacts of 
placements in direct-hire versus temporary agency jobs on subsequent employment. In the OLS 
models, the point estimates of the effects of temp agency and direct-hire job placements are 
similar to each other and to the estimates for any job placement. Mirroring the patterns we 
observe for earnings, the 2SLS squares estimates indicate that the positive effects of marginal job 
placements on quarters employed derive entirely from the positive effects of placements in 
direct-hire jobs. The 2SLS estimates of temp agency placements on subsequent quarters worked 
generally are close to zero or, in several models, large and negative, though the latter,are 
imprecisely measured and generally not statistically significant. Thus, among these marginal 
temps, temp agency jobs do not increase, and may even reduce, subsequent quarters worked.
These results are consistent with our findings that placements in temporary agency jobs 
do not reduce, and may even increase, program recidivism. Moreover, coupled with our findings 
that temp agency jobs are associated with higher hourly wages than direct-hire jobs, these results 
indicate that the effects of temporary jobs on subsequent hours worked, not on hourly wages, 
likely explains why marginal temp jobs fail to raise subsequent earnings relative to no job 
placement and lower earnings relative to direct-hire placements. 
c. Evaluating the Robustness of the Long-Term Earnings Effects
One may be legitimately concerned that our identification might be driven by outliers. 
We have performed a large number of robustness tests to verify the basic pattern of results in 
Tables 6 and 7. In Table 10, we re-estimate the UI wage models using the broadest feasible 
sample of all thirteen randomization districts and all years of data (a total of 50,298 Work First 
spells). In all cases, the 2SLS estimates indicate a short-term positive effect of temporary-help 
placement on payroll earnings in quarters zero and one of assignment, and a negative but
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insignificant effect of temporary-help placement on payroll earnings in quarters two through 
four, five through eight, and one through eight summed. As with prior tables, the 2SLS estimates 
for the impacts of direct-hire placements on payroll earnings are consistently positive and 
significant, with stable magnitudes that are comparable to those above.
To provide a more specific check that our results are not driven by one or two districts, 
we separately estimate the earnings impacts of Work First job placements separately for each of 
the six primary random assignment districts in our sample. If this is the case, it should be 
apparent in our by-district results. Because there are only two Work First contractors per district 
in two of the six districts, we only provide two-way (employment/non-employment) earnings 
contrasts for these districts in the 2SLS models. For the remaining four districts, we provide both 
two and three-way (direct-hire, temporary help, non-employment) contrasts.
The overall pattern of results by district for the six districts in our primary sample, found 
in Table 11, appears (to us) surprisingly consistent. Focusing on the 2SLS models, the majority 
of estimates of the effect of any job placement on payroll earnings over one to eight quarters 
following Work First placement - and all of the significant estimates - are positive. When we 
form instrumental variables estimates of the three-earnings contrast between direct-hire, 
temporary help, and non-placement earnings (now limiting the analysis to the four districts 
having three-plus contractors), we also find that the majority of direct-hire earnings effects - and 
all of the significant effects - are positive. As strikingly, more than 75 percent of the 2SLS point 
estimates of the effect of temporary help placements on payroll earnings are negative (though 
none are significant in these sub-samples). The discussion in the econometric framework in 
Section 2 raises the concern that the possible heterogeneity of treatment effects across 
randomization sites potentially complicates interpretation of the 2SLS results. The consistency of
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the by-district results provides some direct evidence that the assumption of homogeneous 
treatment effects among those whose job outcome is affected by contractor assignment is a 
reasonable approximation in our data.
One might also be concerned that a contractor's placement rate with temporary agencies 
is correlated with some other contractor behavior that results in weaker labor market outcomes 
for its clients. Above, we cast doubt on this possibility, noting that contractors provide little 
beyond job placement services and that support services, such as transportation or childcare, 
which might improve job retention, are provided outside the Work First program and are 
available on an equal basis to clients serviced by all contractors. Nevertheless, it is still possible 
that contractors with higher temp placement rates are generally poorer at matching clients in 
good jobs. Under this scenario, our estimates, which instrument temp agency and direct-hire 
placements by contractor assignment, would be capturing the effect of "bad contractors," not the 
effect of temporary agency placements. If this were the case, then we would expect that clients 
placed in direct-hire jobs would also do relatively poorly in high-temp-use contractors. To test 
this possibility, for the sample of Work First clients placed in direct-hire jobs, we regressed 
earnings over the four quarters following program entry on the fraction placed in temporary jobs 
and the fraction not placed in jobs by that individual's contractor in that program along with 
controls for demographic characteristics, the quarter and year of program entry, and earnings 
during the four quarters prior to program entry. In results not reported here, we find that higher 
temporary agency placements at a contractor are associated with modestly higher not lower  
earnings outcomes for those placed in direct-hire jobs. Thus, although this test is not definitive, 
we find no support for the contention that higher temp agency placement rates are associated 
with contractors that, overall, provide poor placement services.
40
Finally, one might be concerned that our results are driven by our sample period, which 
was dominated by a weak economy. One might hypothesize that the primarily negative effects 
of temporary help placements found in earlier tables may reflect the poor state of the economy, 
and that these placements might have had more positive impacts on earnings in an expansionary 
period. To test this possibility, we also performed separate estimates of the impact of Work First 
job placements on payroll earnings for Work First cohorts entering exclusively in the year 1999. 
As noted earlier, 1999 is an exceptional year for our study in that it is the only non-recessionary 
year covered by our data. As displayed in Table 12, the 1999-cohort estimates do not appear to 
support this hypothesis. We consistently find for the 1999 cohort - as with later cohorts - direct- 
hire placements raise earnings by several thousand dollars over the next eight calendar quarters 
(always significant) while temporary help placements appear to reduce earnings by 1,500 to
9fi
3,000 dollars, though these results are never significant in the single cohort sample.
The consistency of the estimates for payroll earnings effects of temporary-help and 
direct-hire placements across entry cohorts, outcome periods, and randomization districts 
substantially increases our confidence in the reliability of these findings. 
6. Conclusions
The primary finding of our analysis is that direct-hire Work First placements induced by 
the random assignment of participants to Work First contractors significantly increase quarters 
employed and raise marginal participants' payroll earnings by several thousand dollars over the 
subsequent two years - a relationship that is significant, consistent across samples, and 
economically large. By contrast, we find that temporary-help placements do not raise - and quite
20 Notably, 2SLS estimates of the effects of Work First job placements on recidivism for the 1999 cohort (not reported) are again 
quite comparable to those for the pooled 2000 through 2003 cohorts.
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possibly lower - quarters employed and the payroll earnings of Work First clients over the one to 
two years following placement.
We had anticipated finding, consistent with the studies cited in Section 1, that temporary- 
help placements yield small but potentially positive improvements in labor market outcomes for 
Work First participants. This is not what we conclude. Both administrative and UI data are 
consistent in indicating that temporary help placements do not appear to improve labor market 
outcomes for Work First participants. As shown in Tables 3 and 4, temporary-help placements 
do raise participants' short-term earnings during their Work First spells. This pattern is initially 
found in the administrative earnings data collected by Work First contractors and confirmed by 
the analysis of UI wage records in Tables 6 through 8. Yet, the recidivism results found in the 
administrative data (Table 5) hinted that these gains are fleeting. All instrumental variables 
estimates of the effects of job-placement on Work First recidivism suggest that temporary-help 
placements increase Work First recidivism, even while direct-hire placements reduce it. Most 
dispositive for our conclusions are the results for payroll earnings drawn from the universe of 
Michigan Unemployment Insurance records. For all permutations of sampled districts, entry 
cohorts, and post-assignment time interval, our estimates uniformly demonstrate that temporary 
help placements have zero or negative effects on payroll earnings while direct-hire placements 
have significant, durable earnings benefits.
Our data do not permit a detailed exploration of why temporary help placements appear 
to provide (at best) no long-term benefits to Work First participants. Our leading hypothesis, 
however, is that temporary-help assignments may displace other productive job-search and 
employment opportunities. Consequently, the short-term earnings benefits of temporary help 
jobs - including, as shown in Table 3, comparatively high wages, weekly hours and weekly
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earnings during the initial placement - are more than offset by other negatives of temporary help 
positions, most likely the short-term and sporadic nature of job assignments. This hypothesis is 
supported by our findings that temporary agency employment does not increase, and may even 
reduce, quarters worked over the subsequent eight quarters, and by our findings that temporary 
agency jobs do not reduce program recidivism and may even increase it. The termination of 
temporary help job spells may lead to either non-employment or a repeat spell in the Work First 
program while participants seek to reenter the labor market. Either outcome may result in 
earnings losses over the longer term that more than offset the short-term earnings benefits of 
temporary help placements.
We should emphasize that some individuals may well reap long-term benefits from a 
temporary agency assignment. Our results showing no long-term benefit of temporary agency 
jobs only pertain to the marginal temp job placements; our identification strategy estimates the 
effects for individuals whose job status or type was impacted by contractor assignment. 
Nevertheless, the findings from our quasi-experiment are particularly germane for policy. The 
relevant policy question is whether job programs assisting welfare and other low-wage workers 
could improve clients' labor market outcomes by placing more clients with temporary agency 
positions. Our quasi-experiment provides direct evidence on this question.
Based on observational data used in the studies cited above, several researchers recently 
have advocated greater use of temporary help agencies in job placement programs to help 
welfare and low-wage workers transition to employment (Lane et al., 2003; Andersson et al., 
2005; Holzer 2004). The evidence from our quasi-experimental study indicates that such a 
policy prescription is certainly premature and likely misguided.
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Appendix: The Holm-Bonferroni test
The canonical Bonferroni test is based on the 'Bonferroni
inequality:' pr(^4 or B} < pr(A) + pr(B). This inequality is useful because it holds regardless of 
whether A and B are independent. Consequently, if we want to test whether 
(pr(A) < a or pr(B) < a), it is sufficient to test that pr(A) <a/2 and pr(£) < a/2 . Using this logic, 
the Bonferroni test compares each individual p-value in a multiple comparison to the critical 
value a divided by the number of comparisons, N. The Bonferroni rejects the null if any of 
the N comparisons falls below the critical value (aIN}.
As is well known, the Bonferroni method is extremely conservative and hence has limited 
power to reject the null if two or more of the null hypotheses are in fact false. The reason for this 
low power is that the Bonferroni applies the same critical value to each null; yet, after each null 
that is accepted, fewer tests remain and hence a higher (less conservative) critical threshold is 
appropriate.
Holm's variant of the Bonferroni accounts for this fact by applying a different critical 
value for each hypothesis. With TV tests {A} ,A2 ,...,AN } and critical value a , the Holm- 
Bonferroni orders the p-values from lowest to highest and compares each p-value to the critical 
value of a /(N - i + 1), where i is the ranking of the p-value. The procedure is sequential: the
lowest p-value is compared to the most conservative critical value (a/N); conditional on 
acceptance of the null, the next p-value is compared to a/(N-l) , etc. If any comparison rejects,
the multiple-comparison is said to reject the null. Because each sequential test uses the 
appropriate Bonferroni threshold for the number of hypotheses remaining (e.g., the critical value 
for the final hypothesis is al(N-N + i) = a), the Holm-Bonferroni maintains an expected Type I
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Table 1. Characteristics of Work First Participants, by Job Type Sample: Six 








% High school dropout
% High school
% High school plus
% Education unknown







































































































































































Mean (standard error) of variable reported.
Table 2. P-Values of Holm-Bonferroni Tests of Random Assignment across Work First
Contractors and of First Stage Effects of Contractor Assignment on Employment Outcomes
during Work First Spells: Primary Six-District Sample, Assignment Years 1999 - 2003.
Random Assignment District
Assignment Year_____District A District B District C District D District E District F All 
1999-2000
Randomization 0.78 0.02 0.46 0.17 0.59 0.42 0.10 
Any employment 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.74 0.49 0.00 
Temp v. direct v. none 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 1,951 1,216 900 963 844 720 6,594
2000 - 2001
Randomization 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.12 0.57 0.22 0.18 
Any employment 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 
Temp v. direct v. none 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 
N 2,026 1,474 887 858 900 1,590 7,735
2001 - 2002
Randomization 0.34 0.18 0.21 0.61 0.80 0.59 0.99 
Any employment 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Temp v. direct v. none 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 2,093 1,651 1,051 970 822 1,693 8,280
2002 - 2003
Randomization 0.46 0.96 0.37 0.25 0.63 0.28 0.99 
Any employment 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Temp v. direct v. none 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 775 649 337 334 431 1,013 3,539
All Years
Randomization 0.39 0.07 0.12 0.47 0.99 0.90 0.84 
Any employment 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Temp v. direct v. none 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N______________6,845 4,990 3,175 3,125 2,997 5,016 26.148 
The first row of each panel provides the p-value for the null hypothesis that the 8 main sample 
covariates are balanced across clients assigned to Work First contractors within a randomization 
district. These covariates are: gender, race, age, high-school dropout status, total quarters 
employed and total employent earnings in eight quarters prior to Work First assignment, total 
quarters employed in temporary help agencies and total temporary help agency earnings in eight 
quarters prior to Work First assignment. The second row in each panel provides the p-value for 
the null-hypothesis that the share obtaining any employment during the Work First spell is 
balanced across contractors in a region. The third row in each panel provides the p-value for the 
null-hypothesis that the share obtaining direct-hire employment, temporary help agency 
employment, and no employment during the Work First spell is balanced across contractors in a 
region.
Table 3. The Effect of Work-First Job Placements on In-Program Earnings 
Sample: Six Primary Randomization Districts
A. Clients Assigned 2000 
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 




































B. Clients Assigned 1999 










































































































































Robust standard errors clustered on Work First contractor assignment x year are in parentheses.
Table 4. The Effect of Work-First Job Placements on In-Program Earnings 
Sample: Thirteen Randomization Districts
A. Assigned 2000 - 2003 B. Assigned 1999 - 2003 
(D (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 




































































































Robust standard errors clustered on Work First contractor assignment x year are in 
parentheses. Instrumental variables: contractor x year of assignment.
Table 5. The Effect of Work-First Job Placements on Program Recidvism
A. 6 Districts, Clients Assigned 2000 - 
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 




































0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 . 
19,544
360 Day Recidvisim:
-0.10 0.03 0.04 
(0.01) (0.07) (0.05)
0.03 0.01 0.01 
11,
720 Day Recidivism:











































B. 6 Districts, Clients Assigned 1999 - 
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
360 Day Recidivism:
-0.09 -0.01 0.02 
(0.01) (0.05) (0.04)












-0.11 0.00 0.03 
(0.01) (0.08) (0.05)












-0.08 -0.01 -0.04 
(0.01) (0.08) (0.06)



































C. 13 Districts, 1999- 























































Robust standard errors clustered on Work First contractor assignment x year are in parentheses. Recidivism is measured from date of
Table 6. The Effect of Work-First Job Placements on Wage and Salary Earnings 
Sample: Six Primary Randomization Districts
A. Clients Assigned 2000 - 2003 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
B. Clients Assigned 1999 - 2003 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(6) 
2SLS
Earnings During Quarter of Work First Assignment













































Earnings in First Quarter Following Work First Assignment









































































































Robust standard errors clustered on Work First contractor assignment x year are in parentheses.
Table 7. The Effect of Work-First Job Placements on Wage and Salary Earnings 
Sample: Six Primary Randomization Districts
A. Clients Assigned 2000 - 2002 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
B. Clients Assigned 1999 - 2002 
d) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS











274 33 308 
(43) (183) (207)
303 637 453 
(21) (219) (131)
0.25 0.26 0.23 0.25
309 313 389 
(19) (105) (75) 
302 5 306 
(39) (177) (127)
31 1 577 455 
(17) (220) (100)
0.26 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.25











667 -190 254 
(53) (385) (493)
798 1,379 845 
(26) (401) (247)
0.18 0.18 0.10 0.18
745 596 625 
(24) (193) (160) 
645 -42 307 
(53) (330) (299)
772 1,143 876 
(24) (441) (190)
0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.18











1,532 -2,677 -1,450 
(188) (1,713) (1,735)
1,598 3,776 2,186 
(111) (1,589) (992)
0.18 0.19 0.06 0.16
1 ,529 587 747 
(71) (708) (490) 
1,346 -3,271 -1,636 
(141) (1,350) (995)
1,578 3,895 2,632 
(80) (1,335) (710)
0.20 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.04 0.15











1,613 -1,371 -580 
(232) (1,707) (1,884)
1,692 3,127 2,527 
(143) (1,522) (1,084)
0.18 0.15 0.18 0.17
1,628 1,570 1,421 
(88) (830) (591) 
1,421 -3,438 -1,934 
(174) (1,598) (1,308)
1 ,684 5,862 4,074 
(104) (1,537) (952)
0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.05 0.13















3,812 -4,237 -1,777 
(399) (3,508) (3,952)
4,087 8,282 5,558 
(240) (3,269) (2,164)
0.22 0.23 0.15 0.20
Yes No Yes
11,912
3,902 2,753 2,793 
(152) (1,627) (1,145) 
3,412 -6,751 -3,264 
(313) (2,925) (2,449)
4,034 10,899 7,582 
(172) (3,044) (1,711)
0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.07 0.18
No Yes No Yes 
18,507
Robust standard errors clustered on Work First contractor assignment x year are in parentheses.
Table 8: The Effect of Work-First Job Placements on Quarters of Employment 
Sample: Six Primary Randomization Districts
(1)
OLS
A. Clients Assigned 2000 - 





B. Clients Assigned 
(6) (1) (2) (3) 






Worked During Quarter of Work First Assignment















































Worked in First Quarter Following Work First Assignment














































# Quarters Worked in Quarters 2-4 Following Work First Assignment

































0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13
0.071






















Robust standard errors clustered on Work First contractor assignment x year are in parentheses.
Table 9: The Effect of Work-First Job Placements on Quarters of Employment 
____________Sample: Six Primary Randomization Districts___________________
A. Clients Assigned 2000 - 2002 B. Clients Assigned 1999 - 2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
# Quarters Worked Quarters 2-4 Following Work First Assignment
Any job 0.521 0.297 0.242 0.490 0.206 0.238 
(0.024) (0.151) (0.137) (0.022) (0.155) (0.108)
Temp agency 0.514 -0.149 0.215 0.473 -0.571 -0.082 
Job (0.042) (0.374) (0.339) (0.031) (0.318) (0.243)
Direct-hire job 0.523 0.675 0.261 0.495 0.872 0.491
(0.027) (0.291) (0.157) (0.024) (0.320) (0.148)
R-Squared 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.02 0.11 
HO:Temp=DH 0.847 0.159 0.915 0.499 0.079 0.011
# Quarters Worked Quarters 5-8 Following Work First Assignment
Any job 0.445 0.329 0.310 0.434 0.214 0.281 
(0.028) (0.198) (0.163) (0.020) (0.192) (0.130)
Temp agency 0.415 0.075 0.274 0.387 -0.794 -0.237 
Job (0.055) (0.316) (0.367) (0.040) (0.351) (0.275)
Direct-hire job 0.452 0.544 0.336 0.447 1.078 0.690
(0.029) (0.346) (0.176) (0.021) (0.454) (0.179)
R-Squared 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.10 
HO:Temp=DH 0.492 0.379 0.890 0.154 0.012 0.012
# Quarters Worked Quarters 1-8 Following Work First Assignment
Anyjob 1.318 0.919 0.817 1.253 0.680 0.762 
(0.057) (0.384) (0.338) (0.044) (0.377) (0.267)
Temp agency 1.285 -0.104 0.553 1.199 -1.505 -0.318 
Job (0.098) (0.706) (0.763) (0.069) (0.675) (0.569)
Direct-hire job 1.326 1.785 1.005 1.268 2.553 1.616
(0.059) (0.661) (0.347) (0.047) (0.849) (0.350)
R-Squared 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.01 0.14 
HO:Temp=DH 0.674 0.091 0.617 0.332 0.011 0.004
Contractor
x yr No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No 
_N_________________11,912__________________________18,507____________ 
Robust standard errors clustered on Work First contractor assignment x year are in parentheses.
Table 10. The Effect of Work-First Job Placements on Wage and Salary Earnings. 
Sample: Thirteen Randomization Districts
Assigned 1999-2003 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Assigned 1999-2002 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS



















0.25 0.25 0.26 0.25




























0.19 0.18 0.19 0.18
Earnings in Quarters 2 -
1,674 641 
(46) (254) 




0.20 0.19 0.20 0.19
Earnings in Quarters 5 -
















0.20 0.19 0.20 0.18
8 Following Assignment
1 ,642 782 
(66) (527) 












0.24 0.23 0.24 0.22 
35,321
Robust standard errors clustered on Work First contractor assignment x year are in 
parentheses. Instrumental variables: contractor x year of assignment.
Table 11: The Effect of Work-First Job Placements on Non-Program Earnings
Sample: Six Primary Randomization Districts and All Districts,
Clients Assigned in Program Years 1999 - 2000
6 districts All districts










327.58 376.96 332.59 235.19 
(37.14) (200.51) (20.76) (144.75)
0.25 0.25 0.26 0.25
345.57 298.28 0.00 
(73.32) (182.76)

























693.00 717.29 0.00 757.71 375.03 
(48.18) (254.01) (30.98) (239.79)
0.18 0.18 0.19 0.17 
C. Earnings in Quarters 2
1,416.34 916.21 0.00 1,501.24 522.76 
(81.49) (415.65) 20.76 (70.95) (340.29)
0.22 0.21 0.21 0.20
D. Earnings in Quarters 5
1,528.83 1,909.25 0.00 1,562.33 807.98 
(145.20) (1,316.07) 20.76 (87.73) (1,051.33)
0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
E. Earnings in Quarters 1
3,638.16 3,542.74 0.00 3,821.28 1,705.77 
(222.89) (1,552.20) 20.76 (160.01) (1,454.32)
6,595 13,945
610.40 392.31 0.00 
(110.52) (313.84)
719.13 1088.28 0.00 
(45.96) (332.52)
0.19 0.17 
- 4 Following Work First Assignment
1,075.48 -1,701.47 0.00 
(191.26) (566.23) 20.76
1,524.19 3,904.50 0.00 
(101.72) (648.59) 20.76
0.22 0.12
- 8 Following Work First Assignment
1,148.59 -2,894.95 0.00 
(261.76) (1,341.70) 20.76
1,649.14 7,393.65 0.00 
(144.80) (1,426.38) 20.76
0.18
- 8 Following Work First Assignment
2,834.47 -4,204.10 0.00 
(493.82) (1,806.80) 20.76























Robust standard errors, clustered on Work First contractor assignment x year, are in parentheses.
Table 12: The Effect of Work-First Job Placements on Non-Program Earnings 
Estimates by Randomization District, Clients Assigned Years 2000 - 200;
District A
OLS 2SLS
District B District C
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
District D District E
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
District F
OLS 2SLS
A. Any Employment versus Non-Employment 






309 326 411 1,314 
(33) (151) (36) (855)
0.26 0.29
305 461 262 419 











800 252 903 916 
(46) (219) (52) (1115)
0.17 0.19
861 1,468 722 592 











1,791 309 2,044 -2,086 
(154) (714) (180) (4056)
1,500 2,805 1,702 1,482 
(138) (733) (178) (2,233)
0.19 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.19 
4,894 3,774 2,275 4,296 2,162














193 -149 303 -3,197 
(56) (576) (66) (4,137)
348 884 437 -697 
















567 -1,464 636 -5,859 
(77) (952) (87) (7,667)
878 2,271 967 -2,105 


















1,231 -4,571 2,081 -9,647 
(255) (3,100) (352) (19,191)
1,977 6,048 2,035 -5,457 









Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Instrumental variables: Contractor.
